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EXPLORATION FOR OIL AND THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX
INTRODUCTION
The unprecedented demand for petroleum products dur-
ing World War II has continued to plague the post-war
period. This is due to a tremendous increase in civilian oil-
consuming units, such as heating plants and diesel engines,
accompanied by abnormally large peace-time military re-
quirements stemming from the current national defense pro-
gram. While the shortage of tank cars, tankers, and steel
pipe lines has presented the most immediately pressing prob-
lem,1 our petroleum industry is most acutely sensitive to the
marginal nature of underground oil reserves in North
America. Consequently exploration activities have reached
an all-time high, with millions of dollars being spent an-
nually in the relentless, competitive search, both in this
country and abroad, for new oil fields to replace those that
are fast becoming exhausted.
There is little doubt that costs of exploration activities
are ordinary and necessary, in the non-technical sense of
those words. They are ordinary in the sense that certain
oil producers (those known as "operators") commonly incur
them;' they are necessary in the sense that without them
such producers could not meet competition and would go
out of business. However, since the decision in the Scher-
merhom case 8 in 1942, followed 'by the prompt issuance of
1 See generally H. R. REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF PETROIZUM IN RELATION
TO NATIONAL DEFENSE, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948).
2 See Texas Conservative Oil Company v. Jolly, 149 S. W. 2d 265, 268 (1941),
where the court said that it thought employment of a geologist to survey an area
was in the "ordinary course" of an oil producing business. An "operator" is one
who holds a working or operating interest in any tract or parcel of land either as
a fee owner or under a lease or any other form of contract granting working or
operating rights. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.23(m)-16(b)(1)(i) (1943).
3 Schermerhorn Oil Corporation, 46 B.T.A. 151 (1942), discussed infra.
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somewhat ambiguous instructions ' by the Bureau of In-
ternal Revenue to its field offices with respect to geological
and geophysical expenditures, there has been serious doubt
that exploration costs are "ordinary and necessary" expenses
of the type made currently deductible by Section 23 of the
Internal Revenue Code.' At the same time the realization
has sprung up that the option granted by the Treasury
Regulations covering intangible drilling and development
costs 0 does not extend to exploration costs-a realization
expressly confirmed by the Tax Court's decision in the case
of The Louisiana Land And Exploration Company in 1946.'
Unfortunately the Bureau has not seen fit to publish a
ruling for the guidance of taxpayers 8 on the subject of
exploration costs, apparently preferring to compromise dif-
ferences with oil producers in the division engineers' offices
instead of insisting on strict conformity with the rules laid
down in the Scherre7horn and Louisiana Land And Ex-
ploration Company cases. This is almost certain to result
in differences in treatment of taxpayers according to the
differing interpretations of the Bureau's instructions by the
various division engineers and their engineer revenue agents.
The extent to which such differences in treatment may be
resisted by the taxpayers, on the one hand, or enforced by
the Bureau, on the other, may be indicated by the analysis
that follows.
4 Unpublished, However, see note 25 infra.
5 In T. R v. Cona §23(a) (1) (A) provides: "In computing net income there
shall be allowed as deductions: . . .All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid
or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business . .
6 Treas. Reg. 111, §29.23(m)-16(b)(1) (1943), discussed infra.
7 7 T. C. 507 (1946), aff'd, 161 F. 2d 842 (C.CA. 5th 1947).
s One of the arguments in the taxpayer's brief in The Louisiana Land And
Exploration Company, supra note 7, was that the Bureau's instructions covering
geological and geophysical expenditures were not incorporated in the Regulations, or
a General Counsel's Memorandum, or even an I. T. Mimeograph. In H. R. REP.
No. 761, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945), it was declared that uncertainty of the
Regulations granting an option to capitalize or deduct intangible drilling costs
was materially interfering with exploration for and production of oil.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
NATURE OF EXPLORATION
Before attempting to evaluate the tax atmosphere sur-
rounding exploration costs, it is essential that a precise
understanding be had of the nature and function of explora-
tion. A distinction should first be made between explora-
tion-a preliminary step-and development-the final step
in oil production.9 Next, it should be realized that explora-
tion, as such, is ordinarily not aimed at finding oil, but merely
the geological conditions that are commonly associated with
the accumulation of oil,"0 sometimes collectively referred to
as a "prospect"."1 Once a prospect has been located, oil and
gas leases are acquired, whenever practicable, in all proper-
ties in the vicinity. 2 Then, at a specific location on the
block of leased properties selected on the basis of competent
geological advice, "one will drill a wild cat or test well to a
depth great enough to test all probable oil-bearing formation
or to the greatest depth possible and practical." 11 If a
flowing well is the happy result, the public may be "sur-
prised," but the geologist or geophysicist and the oil pro-
ducer he works for consider it as merely the confirmation of
expectations based on carefully assembled, and expensive,
scientific data. Indeed, the technique of exploration has
improved to the point where, as long ago as 1939, the state-
ment was made by the Chief Geologist of the Sun Oil Com-
pany, F. H. Lahee, that "In prospecting by the best modem
0 The following steps in the technique of production of oil are described in
AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, PETROLEUM INDUSTRY HEAINxGs BEFORE
T=E TrMPORARY NATIONAL EcoNoMrc COMmiTTR 14 (1943):
a. Bxploration-selecting a proper site for an exploratory well.
b. Leasing-obtaining the right to drill.
c. Testing-drilling a wild cat or test well to a depth great enough to test
all probable oil-bearing formations (or "sands").
d. Development-drilling of a test well does not disclose the true elements
and potentialities of a field. They must be determined by further drilling.
10 NETTLETON, GEOPHYSICAL PROSPECTING FOR O. 3 (1940).
1"1 RICE, DICTIONARY Or GEOLOGICAL TERMS (1940).
12 Provided, of course, such leases were not acquired prior to exploration.
is AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, op. cit. supra note 9, at 289 (state-
ment by E. De Golyer, Consulting Geologist).
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practice, the odds against success are probably as low as
6 to 7 against 1."
At the risk of oversimplification, it might be helpful to
visualize the geological conditions commonly associated with
the accumulation of oil as taking the form of a hill (known
as an "anomaly") rising above the surface of a relatively
flat rock bed, both of which are under the surface of the
earth. 5 The object of exploration ordinarily is to locate the
anomaly and to determine its size and shape. Two general
methods of exploration may be used: direct (geological),
and indirect (geophysical). Geological surveying for oil to-
day is usually conducted by means of "core drilling"--drill-
ing a hole for the purpose of obtaining samples ("cores") of
sand and rock 1" at various levels of the subsurface. 17 There
are several ways of conducting geophysical surveys, but the
ones most widely followed require the use of a magnetometer,
gravitymeter, or seismograph, or often a combination thereof.
The basic procedure in the use of these instruments con-
sists in measuring force fields at the surface of the earth
and, on the basis of variations in these force fields that
result from subsurface configurations, locating and mapping
anomalies. 8
The magnetometer, for example, records degrees of mag-
netic intensity, which fluctuate according to subsurface struc-
tural formations. By plotting the recordings as the survey
team moves along the surface of the earth, a contour map
is prepared which will give general indications of the possible
14 Id. at 288.
15 For a complete list of types of anomalies, with accompanying sketches,
see NrLr0'o r, op. it. supra note 10, at 45. Some anomalies appear above the
earth's surface, but for the most part these have long since been exploited.
16 An oil sand is that part of subsurface rock in which free oil is present
within the rock pores in recoverable quantities.
17 Also known as "slim-hole" drilling, this method is used by the mining
industry as well as the petroleum industry. See AzmanCA PETRoL um INsTrrUTE,
Op. cit. supra note 9, at 293; also JAxosxY, EXPLORATION GFOPHYSICs 12 (1940).
18 JAXOSKY, Op. cit. supra note 17, at 18, who also lists the following addi-
tional geophysical methods: electrical, radioactive, geothermal, and geochemical.
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existence of anomalies. 9 This information can be used as
the basis of a more detailed survey over such part of the
subsurface as appears interesting (the "area of interest").
Here is where the seismograph comes in, for under favorable
conditions it will enable the mapping of a geologic bed many
thousands of feet under the surface.2" The seismograph
operates on the principle that "hard rocks reflect waves
just as hard glass reflects light." By setting off dynamite
charges, waves are set in motion which bounce back from
the subsurface rocks. The seismograph measures the time
of travel of the wave from the surface down to the rock and
back, thus enabling one to determine the depth of the rock
with reasonable accuracy; in fact, errors of tolerance of
only twenty-five feet are allowable. The difference in time
intervals will indicate and measure the differences in depth as
the seismograph is moved along over the surface of the earth,
so that the reflecting surface can be plotted on a contour
map." Thus, a preliminary magnetic or gravimetric survey
over a large area (commonly referred to as a "reconnaissance
survey") is ordinarily followed by the more expensive, but
much more accurate, seismic survey (commonly referred to
as a "detail survey") over any area of interest revealed by
the reconnaissance survey.22
From the foregoing, it should be understood that "ex-
ploration" refers to various geological and geophysical sur-
veys, whose function is that of "localizing areas to lease and
prospects to drill",2" or, more precisely, whose function is
19 The latest development in the magnetic method is the airborne magneto-
meter, used by the government and by some mining companies. Jensen, Airborne
Magnetometer, The Oil and Gas Journal, March 11, 1948, p. 89.
20 NEETaow, op. cit. supra note 10, at 6.
21 HAGER, PRACTICAL OiL GEoLOGY 387 (5th ed. 1938).
22 It should not be inferred that the seismograph cannot be used in a
reconnaissance survey. If the dynamite charges should be set off more than a
mile apart, the detail of subsurface formation would be lacking, and the survey
would then be appropriately termed "reconnaissance." HAGER, op. cit. supra note
21, at 394.
23 24 BuLTN op THE A a cAN AssociATroN OF PETROLEUm GEorocSTs
1380 (1940) (statement by E. A. Eckhardt, past president of the Society of
Exploration Geophysicists).
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that of furnishing oil producers with data, such as a contour
map, that will be used as a basis for acquiring, or retaining,
oil and gas leases.4
BUREAU POSITION ON EXPLORATION COSTS
Prior to the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals in the
Schermerhorn case, it seems that the policy of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue was to permit costs of exploration to
be deducted as ordinary and necessary business expenses if
the work was carried out by the taxpayer's own staff of
geologists; but if the work was done under contract by a
professional exploration company, the costs were required
to be capitalized. Following the Schermerhorn case, how-
ever, the Commissioner's headquarters issued instructions to
the field directing that the costs of all geological alid geo-
physical surveys resulting in the acquisition or retention of
properties be capitalized.25 Unfortunately these instructions
24 NLrmarox, op. cit. supra note 10, at 419, after observing that the final
result of a geophysical survey is nearly always a map, states: "The values, con-
tours, or perhaps only the nebulous outlines of one or more 'areas of interest'
on such a map are the basis of decisions affecting leasing, drilling, or perhaps more
geophysical work. In any case these decisions will usually involve at least a few
thousand and not infrequently many thousand or even hundreds of thousands
of dollars. The geophysical map is generally accompanied by a written report.
The text of the report may give technical details of the geophysical field opera-
tions, the interpretation methods and calculations or the geology of the area; but
when the decisions are made, it is probably the map that receives the final
study and closest attention. In many cases the loss of a geophysical report
would not be serious if the loss did not include the map." (Emphasis supplied.)
25 The instructions are described by F. J. Blaise, certified public accountant,
in his article, The Deductibility of Exploration Costs, 23 TAXES 221, 222 (1945).
They place survey costs in four categories and prescribe their treatment as follows:
(A) Geological and geophysical expense, incurred for the purpose of
determining whether properties should be acquired or rejected, which re-
sulted in the acquisition of properties. (This expense should be capital-
ized as part of the cost of the properties acquired.)
(B) Geological and geophysical expense, incurred on properties al-
ready owned for the purpose of determining whether they should be
retained under lease or surrendered, which resulted in their retention.
(This expense should be capitalized as part of the cost" of the properties
retained.)
(C) Geological and geophysical exploration expense which did not
result in the acquisition of properties, or resulted in the surrender of
properties owned, or of a general nature not applicable to any specific
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
appear to have been somewhat ambiguously worded. Con-
sider, for example, the following problems posed by one
writer: 26
" . . . the Commissioner contends that the cost of the survey
should be capitalized on the acreage retained. Does that mean
that, if 10,000 acres are held before the survey and as a re-
sult of the survey 9,000 acres are surrendered, the cost of the
survey should be capitalized on the 1,000 acres retained? That
would conflict with the Commissioner's third point [classifica-
tion (C), footnote 25] which permits a deduction for ex-
ploration expense which resulted in the surrender of properties.
It frequently happens that a survey is made in a locality
where some acreage is held and as a result of the survey part
of the acreage is surrendered and also some new acreage is
acquired. What happens to the cost of that survey?" 2
Another problem arises from a reference in the instructions
to exploration expense "of a general nature not applicable
to any specific properties." While it is difficult to conceive
of a geological or geophysical survey that would not be
applicable to the specific area (and the properties therein)-
large or small-over which the survey was being conducted,
this indiscriminate phrasing has occasioned the belief, in
some quarters, that costs of reconnaissance surveys (as dis-
properties. (This expense is allowable as a current deduction.) (Em-
phasis supplied.)
(D) Geological and geophysical expense incurred for the purpose of
determining the location of wells to be drilled, supervising the drilling
of wells, and facilitating the production of wells. (This expense is allow-
able as a current deduction, provided a proper election has been made
under the option provided by Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23(m)-16 (1940),
carried over to Treas. Reg. 111 (1943).)
28 Id. at 223.
27 The answer is that the entire cost of the survey probably should be
capitalized. This would be so whether there was but one lease covering the
10,000 acres held before the survey, or several leases ("properties"), as will be
seen from the discussion infra. Such a problem arises from a failure to set forth
in the instructions that the word "properties" is used in the sense of "interest"
(e.g. an oil and gas lease) as defined by the Regulations, rather than in the
sense of "acres" or "land." Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23(m)-l(i) (1943) states: "The
taxpayer's interest in each separate mineral property is a separate 'property'; but,
where two or more mineral properties are included in a single tract or parcel of
land, the taxpayer's interest in such mineral properties may be considered to be
a single 'property,' provided such treatment is consistently followed." For an
elaborate discussion of the Bureau's concept of a "property," see G.C.M. 22106,
1941-1 CuM. BuLt. 245, modified by G.C.M. 24094, 1944 CuM. BuLL. 250.
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tinguished from costs of detail surveys) are currently de-
ductible, regardless of the part they play in acquisition of
properties.
The next statement disclosing the Bureau's position on
exploration costs appeared in a letter from the Commissioner,
dated May 4, 1 94 5 ,1 in which it was held that a "bottom
hole contribution" 29 to the drilling of a producing well is
a capital expenditure to be charged to the cost of "the proper-
ties benefited by the exploration." However, it was also
stated that a contribution to the drilling of a dry well 10
would be presumed to be of no benefit to the contributor,
who would be allowed to deduct it as an ordinary loss. Just
why such a presumption would be indulged was not indi-
cated; but, where geological information obtained from drill-
ing a dry hole is used as a basis for the acquisition or reten-
tion of properties, it would seem that the cost of that in-
formation should be capitalized to the same extent that the
cost of information obtained from drilling a producing well
is required to be capitalized. In referring to "properties
benefited by the exploration", the Bureau showed for the
first time that it was resting its rule of capitalization of ex-
ploration costs on Section 24(a) (2) of the Internal Revenue
Code,"1 an extremely questionable basis.
28 5 P-H 1945 FED. TAX SERV. 11 76,209.
29 "Money or property given to an operator for his use in the drilling of a
well on property in which the payor has no interest. The contribution is payable
whether the well is productive or non-productive." ARTHUR AN.DEs'N & Co.,
OIM AND GAS FEDER.L INco m TAX MANUAL 161 (1948). The example is given
(pp. 15-16) of operator A, who prepares to drill a well. If the well is pro-
ductive, information thereby obtained by A regarding the geologic and producing
possibilities will be beneficial to B, who owns an adjoining lease. Accordingly,
B agrees to contribute $5,000 to the cost of drilling A's well.
30 This could be either a "bottom hold contribution" or a "dry hole con-
tribution", which is payable only in the event the well is found to be non-pro-
ductive. Ibid.
81 INT. Rxv. CODE § 24(a) (2) provides that in computing net income no
deduction shall in any case be allowed in respect of "Any amount paid out for
new buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments made to increase
the value of any property or estate."
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The latest expression of Bureau policy on this subject was
contained in a Mimeograph, dated November 5, 1946.82
Although this instruction was principally concerned with one
of the separate classes of income used in determining "ab-
normal income" for purposes of the excess profits tax, the
following noteworthy statement was made:
Geological and geophysical survey costs have been the sub-
ject of intensive study by the Bureau and repeated represen-
tations by the industry. The Bureau's position is that the
cost of all such surveys which have for their purpose the
accumulation of knowledge on which to base action in the
acquisition or retention of property is capital in nature. Only
that small portion of such surveys which have [sic] for their
[sic] object the location of the exact spot on which to drill a
well has been recognized as part of the development cost of
the lease and, as such, forming a part of the intangible devel-
opment cost subject to the option provided by Section
29.23(m)-16 of Regulations 111 ...
This is clear evidence that the Bureau has abandoned Sec-
tion 24(a) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code as the basis
for its rule of capitalization of exploration costs and has
returned to the "acquisition or retention" theory, originally
adopted from the Schermerhorn opinion when the Bureau's
first instructions to the field were issued.
STATUS OF THE LAW ON EXPLORATION COSTS
Costs of Acquisition or Retention as Capital Expenditures
There is no provision in either the Internal Revenue Code
or in the Treasury Regulations which specifically mentions
exploration costs, much less provides for their treatment.
However, Section 41 of the Internal Revenue Code's requires
32 Development Period of Oil Properties in Connection uith the Application
of Section 721(a)(2)(C) of the Internal Revenue Code, 1946-2 Cum. BULL. 95.
33 INT. Rav. ConE § 41 provides: "The net income shall be computed upon
the basis of the taxpayer's annual accounting period . . . in accordance with the
method of accounting regularly employed in keeping the books of such taxpayer;
but if no such method of accounting has been so employed, or if the method
employed does not clearly reflect the income, the computation shall be in accord-
ance with such method as in the opinion of the Commissioner does clearly
reflect the income .... "
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that the taxpayer's accounting method clearly reflect income.
Except for a few cases involving special circumstances
clearly not related to exploration for oil, 4 this requirement
has consistently been held to necessitate capitalization of
costs of acquiring or retaining assets having a useful life
extending substantially beyond the year in which such costs
were incurred. 5 This rests on the principle that such costs
should be recovered (for example, by depreciation or deple-
tion) over a period of years rather than a period of one
year if distortion of annual income is to be avoided. Over
forty years ago the Supreme Court of the United States
recognized such a principle in a rate case," where a carrier
sought to base its rates on operating expenses that included
expenditures for real estate, right of way, tunnels, bridges,
and other permanent-type improvements. The Court upheld
a decision of the Interstate Commerce Commission that the
rates were excessive, saying:
It would seem as if expenditures for additions to construc-
tion and equipment, as expenditures for original construction
and equipment, should be reimbursed by all of the traffic they
accommodate during the period of their duration, and that
improvements that will last many years should not be charged
wholly against the revenue of a single year.
Since that time, this principle has been readily and uni-
formly applied to require capitalization in numerous federal
34 Marsh Fork Coal Co. v. Lucas, 42 F. 2d 83 (C.C.A. 4th 1930) (expen-
ditures for electric locomotives, mine cars and steel rails held deductible as
operating expenses where they did not increase production, decrease costs of pro-
duction, or add to value of a mine, but were necessary to merely maintain normal
output of the mine); Commissioner v. Brier Hill Collieries, 50 F. 2d 777 (C.CA.
6th 1931). Cf. Libby & Blouin, Ltd., 4 B.T.A. 910 (1926) (expenditures for small
parts of large machine to maintain efficient working condition held deductible as
ordinary and necessary business expense).
35 Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.41-3(2) (1943) reads: "Expenditures made during
the year should be properly classified as between capital and expense; that is
to say, expenditures for items of plant, equipment, etc., which have a useful life
extending substantially beyond the year should be charged to a capital account
and not to an expense account." (Emphasis supplied.)
36 Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 206 U.S.
441, 462, 27 S. Ct. 700, 707, 51 L. Ed. 1128, 1137 (1907).
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income tax cases, 7 not the least significant of which are
those concerned with research and development costs." The
mere fact that an expenditure was not part of the purchase
price of an asset has never prevented it from being capital-
ized as part of the cost of that asset. Indeed, most of the
decisions requiring capitalization have been concerned with
costs other than the purchase price, and a considerable num-
ber of them have concerned costs of acquiring or retaining
interests in real property. 9
37 Clark Thread Co. v. Commissioner, 100 F. 2d 257 (C.C.A. 3d 1938)
(sum paid competitor to discontinue use of trade name held capital expenditure);
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation v. Handy, 16 F. Supp. 110 (D.C. Del.
1936) (deduction of accountant's fee for examining accounts of companies being
taken over by taxpayer disallowed, because such expense was "linked with the
acquisition of capital assets"); Manistique Lumber and Supply Co., 29 B.T.A.
26 (1933) (cost of road on taxpayer's lumberyard held capital expenditure) ; Stires
Corporation, 28 B.T.A. 1 (1933) (deduction of $362,434.60 paid to several influ-
ential people who had been instrumental in securing an option to purchase oil
company stocks disallowed, because such amount "was as much a cost of the
stocks as was the $100,000 paid for the option").
38 Claude Neon Lights, Inc., 35 B.T.A. 424 (1937) (costs of maintaining
laboratory and employing engineers to do research in electricity, rare gases, and
tubular lighting); Forest Products Chemical Co., 27 B.T.A. 638 (1933), ag'd
without written op., (C.C.A. 6th Dec. 18, 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 726, 55
S. Ct. 636, 79 L. Ed. 1257 (1935) (costs of sending president of corporation and
a chemical engineer to Europe to investigate a process for producing acetic add);
Acme Products Co., Inc., 24 B.T.A. 194 (1931) (costs amounting to $79,835.51
incurred in attempt to discover a commercially practical means of manufacturing
ester-gum); Goodell-Pratt Co., 3 B.T.A. 30 (1925) (costs of maintaining depart-
ment for purpose of working out new ideas and developing new tools, patents,
secret processes, methods of manufacture, and special machinery); Giliam Manu-
facturing Co., 1 B.T.A. 967 (1925) (salaries, materials, and overhead in con-
nection with experimentation and development of automobile tops). See also
Stream, Pioneering Activities, 26 TAXES 64 (1948), and the author's article,
Research and Development Costs, PROCEEDINOS OF TME Naw YORK UNIVERSITY
SEVENTH A UAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION (1948), The modus operandi
in exploration for oil is basically the same as that in development of inventions,
the procedure of locating a prospect in exploration having its counterpart in the
prt cedure of "isolating the problem" in invention. See BERLE & DECAMP, INVEN-
TIONS AND THEIR MANAGEMENT 18 (1937).
39 Acer Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 132 F. 2d 512 (C.C.A. 8th 1942)
(portion of officers' salaries allocable to supervising construction of buildings);
Jones' Estate v. Commissioner, 127 F. 2d 231 (C.C.A. 5th 1942) (attorneys'
fees in suit to cancel cloud on title to real property) ; Moynier v. Welch, 97 F. 2d
471 (C.C.A. 9th 1938) (attorney fees and litigation costs over oil royalties);
Home Trust Co. et al. v. Commissioner, 65 F. 2d 532 (C.C.A. 8th 1933) ($75,000
paid to secure immediate possession of 99-year leasehold); Jordan Creek Placers,
43 B.T.A. 131 (1940) (cost of option under which taxpayer had acquired mining
properties); M. & F. Holding Company, 26 B.T.A. 504 (1932) (fee of $25,000
paid in connection with negotiating and closing a long term lease); D. N. & E.
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Exploration Costs as Costs of Acquisition or Retention of
Oil and Gas Properties 4 o
The first case directly concerned with exploration costs
was Seletha 0. Thompson,41 decided by the Board of Tax
Appeals in 1928. There the taxpayer, who was engaged in
buying and selling oil and gas leases, prospecting for oil and
gas, and drilling oil and gas wells, sought to deduct as ordi-
nary and necessary business expenses the cost of maps, ab-
stracts of title, legal opinions on titles, and recording fees;
also $5,241 paid for geological surveys and opinions. The
Commissioner disallowed the deductions and treated the pay-
ments as part of the cost of oil and gas properties. The
Board affirmed, saying:
The evidence establishes that during 1919 the petitioner
expended $1,036.40 for maps, abstracts, legal opinions on titles
and recording fees, and $3,333.33 in settlement of a suit in-
volving title to leased lands. Such items have been held by
the Board to be capital expenditures to be added to the cost
of acquiring the property in connection with which they are
paid and considered in computing gain or loss on sale or in
fixing the basis for depreciation.or depletion .... The same
is true of the amounts paid for geological surveys and opinions,
Walter & Co., Inc., 4 B.T.A. 142 (1926) (payment of $5,000 to real estate agents
for services in procuring lease). See also the cases directly concerned with ex-
ploration costs, discussed infra.
40 It is arguable that exploration costs represent the cost of acquisition of
geological and geophysical maps and should be capitalized as the cost thereof. Cf.
Pitzman's Co. of Surveyors, 21 B.T.A. 1368 (1931) (deduction allowed for depre-
ciation of plat books, city district maps, city topographical maps, blueprints of
subdivisions, and numerous field sketches, owned by firm engaged in engineering
and surveying business); Crooks v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 46 F. 2d 928
(C.CA. 8th 1931) (deduction allowed for obsolescence of abstract plants com-
prising abstract books, maps, plats, indices, and transcripts of judgments); Isbell
Porter Co. v. Commissioner, 40 F. 2d 432 (C.C.A. 2d 1930) (restoration to in-
vested capital allowed in amount of previous deductions for costs of model and
design drawings). All of these decisions presupposed that the maps or drawings
concerned were assets. While it is well known that oil companies treat their
geological and geophysical maps as property of a highly confidential nature and
often use them for trading purposes, it is believed that treating them as assets
would be myopic, for their principal function is to serve as the basis for decisions
regarding the acquisition or retention of properties. Any value that they might
have for trading purposes would be purely accidental and an extremely secondary
objective of any oil producer's exploration program.
41 9 B.TA. 1342 (1928).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
unless, perhaps, it is shown that such payments were made
for surveys and opinions upon tracts never purchased.4
(Emphasis supplied.)
One month later, the Nusbaum case " was decided. Here
the taxpayer had become interested in the oil possibilities
of a forty acre tract. Prior to acquiring a lease of the pro-
perty, services of an oil geologist were secured. After "an
extended investigation and study", the geologist advised ac-
quisition. In payment for these services, it was agreed that
the geologist should receive one-third of any profits that
resulted from operations under the lease. Subsequently a
disagreement arose over the method of determining the share
of profits, as a result of which the geologist surrendered his
rights to receive any profits in exchange for $23,000 (of
which the taxpayer paid $7,640). When the taxpayer sought
to deduct the payment as a business expense, the Commis-
sioner disallowed the deduction and held that such payment
should be regarded as part of the capital cost of the lease.
The Board affirmed "upon the authority of many cases"."
With the exception of a few mining cases " upholding the
principle expressed in the Thompson and Nusbaum opinions,
the next case of major interest was Schermerhorn Oil Cor-
poration,46 decided in 1942. Here the factual situation was
similar to that in the Nusbaum case. The services of one
Tomlinson, an oil geologist, were retained prior to acquisi-
42 Id. at 1345.
43 C. M. Nusbaum, 10 B.TA. 664 (1928).
44 Citing, among others, D. N. & E. Walter & Co., Inc., supra note 39.
45 Parker Gravel Company, 21 B.T.A. 51 (1930) ($122 paid an engineer to
map and estimate the extent of gravel deposits, after taxpayer had secured a
gravel mining lease, held to be a capital expenditure); G. E. Cotton, 25 B.TA.
866 (1932) (costs incurred during exploration stage of mining operations held
to be capital expenditures); Rialto Mining Corporation, 25 B.T.A. 986 (1932)
(casts in connection with survey and exploration of mining property which tax-
payer owned or expected to own held to be capital expenditures). Cf. O.D. 314,
1 Cum. BuLL. 143 (1919) ("All expenditures by a mining company for prospect-
ig and development for the purpose of enlarging the business or continuing it
beyond its present limits must be charged to capital account.").
46 46 B.T.A. 151 (1942), consolidated with the Schermerhorn-Winton Com-
pany and the Charles Weldon Tomlinson cases.
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tion of any leases. On the basis of Tomlinson's advice, cer-
tain oil and gas leases were acquired, it having been agreed
that he would receive ten percent of the net profits there-
from in addition to his regular salary. The principal issue
was whether the Commissioner erred in treating such addi-
tional payments as capital expenditures. The Board of Tax
Appeals pointed out that in the case of North American Oil
Consolidated " it had treated comparable costs as capital
expenditures and said:
The obligation to make the additional payments to Tom-
linson was just as much a part of the cost of acquiring the
leases as the consideration which the companies agreed to
pay the lessors. It arose when the properties were acquired,
the time of payment being postponed until net profits should
be realized. If the companies had covenanted to pay Tom-
linson certain lump sums at the time of acquisition of each
property, it would perhaps be more obvious that such pay-
ments were made in connection with the acquisition of a
capital asset; but there is no substantial distinction between
such payments and those which the corporations covenanted
to make. As we view them they are somewhat analogous to
commissions paid in connection with the purchase of property,
expenditures made for surveys, abstracts of title, or geological
opinions, and amounts paid in defending or perfecting title
to real estate, all of which have been held to be capital ex-
penditures [citing, among others, the Thompson case] ...
The test is whether the expenditures are made in connection
with the acquisition or preservation of a capital asset. If so,
they are capital expenditures.48 (Emphasis supplied.)
47 12 B.T.A. 68 (1928) (four percent of oil produced was paid to attorneys
for services in defending title to certain oil lands and securing land patents
thereon).
48 46 B.T.A. 151, 161-162 (1942). It is true that the Board was then under
the impression that the interests of Tomlinson in net profits from the oil and gas
leases were not economic interests in the leases themselves. It is also true that
this impression subsequently was proved to be erroneous by the Supreme Court's
holding in Kirby Petroleum Company v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 599, 66 S. Ct.
409, 90 L. Ed. 343 (1946), that "Economic interest does not mean title to the
oil in place but the possibility of profit from that economic interest dependent
solely upon the extraction and sale of the oil." However, this does not affect
the validity of the Schermerhorn decision that additional payments to the
geologist were capital expenditures. Whether he received an outright economic
interest in an oil lease at the time of its acquisition or some other kind of
interest, the decisive point is that the additional payments to him by the oil
companies were made "in connection with the acquisition . . .of a capital asset."
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In view of the "acquisition or preservation" test thus pre-
scribed, the Board's decision was clearly indicated by the
facts of the case set forth at page twenty-four of the tax-
payer's own brief:
.. both parties contributed capital at the outset with which
the properties were acquired, Tomlinson furnishing the neces-
sary geographical maps, geological data, and other information
relating to structures, formations and other scientific matters,
including a recommendation as to the advisability of acquir-
ing specific properties . . . and the Schermerhorn companies
contributed the funds with which to purchase and develop
the properties recommended by Tomlinson, or such of the same
as it deemed advisable... (Emphasis supplied.)
The last case directly in point was decided in 1946 by
the Tax Court.49 One of the issues was whether the sum
of $11,361.56, paid out in 1941 for geophysical surveys
covering two tracts held by the taxpayer under a mineral
lease, was deductible as an ordinary and necessary business
expense. Following the survey, the taxpayer had acquired
leases on some additional land adjacent to one of the tracts
surveyed. The Commissioner argued that the entire sum
was "in the nature of an addition to lease cost" and, under
Section 24(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code must be
capitalized.5" The taxpayer replied that Section 24(a)(2)
did not prohibit the deduction claimed. However, the court
declared that it was unnecessary to discuss either the scope
40 The Louisiana Land And Exploration Company, 7 TC 507 (1946), aff'd
on other issues, 161 F. 2d 842 (C.C.A. 5th 1947). The decision on exploration
costs was not appealed.
50 It appears that the Commissioner misconceived his argument when he
cited § 24(a) (2), since this relates generally to betterments and improvements of
assets rather .than to the acquisition of assets. A citation to § 41 and to Treas.
Reg. 103, § 19.41-3(2) (1940) would have been more in point. (The latter cur-
rently appears as Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.41-3(2) (1943), quoted in note 35, supra.)
Geological and geophysical surveys do not "better" the property in the area
surveyed. Indeed the property is no different after such a survey than it was
before. There have been no improvements added, such as the boundary stakes
and markers which characterize a land survey. Cf. Hannibal Missouri Land Co.,
9 B.TA. 1072 (1928) (allocating to each parcel of real estate within a sub-
divided tract a part of the cost of the land survey whereby the tract was
subdivided).
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of that section or the "ordinary and necessary" character of
the disputed deduction, because
... in our view the geophysical expense here involved is capi-
tal in nature and is for that reason not deductible under
Section 23(a) (1) (A). The distinction between capital ex-
penditures and business expenses is generally made by look-
ing to the extent and permanence of the benefit derived from
the outlay. The benefit from business expenses is generally
realized and exhausted within a year... On the other hand,
an item of expense is of a capital nature where it results in
the taxpayer's acquisition or retention of a capital asset, or
in the improvement or development of a capital asset in such
a way that the benefit of the expenditure is enjoyed over a
comparatively lengthy period of business operation. 5 ' (Em-
phasis supplied.)
There was nothing said with respect to whether the court
thought that the amount paid for the surveys should have
been added to the cost of the original lease, to the cost of
the leases subsequently acquired, or to the cost of all of
them.5 2
THE OPTION COVERING INTANGIBLE DRILLING
AND DEVELOPMENT COSTS
The option to deduct or capitalize intangible drilling and
development costs, presently contained in Treasury Regula-
5' 7 TC 507, 514-515 (1946). Although at the time of the Schermerhorn
case real property used in the trade or business (such as an oil and gas lease)
came within the scope of the definition of "capital assets", as set forth in § 117
of the Code, this was not so when the opinion was issued in the case of The
Louisiana Land And Exploration Company. During the interim real property
used in the trade or business had been shifted to the category, of "non-capital
assets" under § 117(i). The reason for this was that Congress considered it
"more appropriate to treat all property used in the trade or business alike, and
not to distinguish between land and other property used in the trade or business."
SENr. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 119 (1942). There was no intention to
provide a basis for distinguishing between expenditures made in the acquisition
of capital assets and expenditures made in the acquisition of non-capital assets.
Such expenditures, in either case, are clearly "capital expenditures" because they
are made in the acquisition of assets that will last substantially beyond the taxable
year.
52 If, as a result of a geophysical survey, both the original lease was retained
and additional leases were acquired, it would seem that the cost of the survey
should be allocated to all of the leases. See the discussion on how to treat
exploration costs for federal income tax purposes, infra.
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tions 111, Section 29.23(m)-16(b)(1) (1943), 53 was first
granted by Treasury Regulations 33, Article 170 (1918).
The original option, which divided operators into two classes
(owners and lessees) for the purpose of determining the
amount of capital to be returned through annual deductions
for depletion, provided:
In the case of the operating fee owner, the amount return-
able through depletion deductions is the . .. cost of the pro-
perty . . . plus . .. the cost of development (other than the
cost of physical property incident to such development) up
to the point at which the income from the developed territory
equals or exceeds the deductible expenses.
In the case of a lessee, the capital thus to be returned is
the amount paid in cash or its equivalent as a bonus or other-
wise by the lessee for the lease, plus also all expenses incurred
in developing the property (exclusive of physical property)
prior to the receipt of income therefrom sufficient to meet all
deductible expenses, after which time as to both owner and
lessee, such incidental expenses as are paid for wages, fuel,
repairs, hauling, etc., in connection with the drilling of wells
and further development of the property, may, at the option
of the operator, be deducted as an operating expense or
charged to capital account. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is thus seen that, in its inception, the option covered only
those expenses arising after the time that receipt of income
from the property was sufficient to meet all deductible ex-
penses-expenses clearly arising subsequent to those incurred
for the purpose of locating and acquiring the property or,
if already acquired, for the purpose of determining whether
or not to retain it.
The option was recast in Treasury Regulations 45, Article
223 (1921), to read as follows:
53 ". . . Examples of items to which this option applies are, all amounts
paid for labor, fuel, repairs, hauling, and supplies, or any of them, which are
used (A) in the drilling, shooting, and cleaning of wells; (B) in such clearing
of ground, draining, road making, surveying, and geological work as are necessary
in preparation for the drilling of wells; and (C) in the construction of such
derricks, tanks, pipe lines, and other physical structures as are necessary for the
drilling of wells and the preparations of wells for the production of oil or
gas.... " (Emphasis supplied.)
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Such incidental expenses as are paid for wages, fuel, re-
pairs, hauling, etc., in connection with the exploration of the
property, drilling of wells, building of pipe lines, and develop-
ment of the property may at the option of the taxpayer be
deducted as an operating expense or charged to the capital
account returnable through depletion. (Emphasis supplied.)
This was upheld in the Ramsey case,5 4 where the taxpayer
sought to include such costs in the basis of leases that had
been sold, although these costs had been previously deducted
under the option. The court recognized that the question
was squarely presented whether the regulation could permit
the irrecoverable cost of drilling oil wells to be classed as
an expense of operation rather than as a permanent im-
provement or betterment. It remarked that whether an oil
well was a permanent improvement was "at least a debatabk
question", and said:
The incidental costs here involved are irretrievably gone
when the well is finished, whether it be a dry hole or a pro-
ducer.... The truth is that the hole upon which the money
is expended is simply a means of reaching the oil sands, and
it is the oil which increases the value of the property; the hole
is of value only if oil is found, and then only as long as the
sands will produce .... we are of the opinion that the holes
through which the oil is recovered are not so conclusively
"permanent improvements or betterments" as to preclude a
regulation permitting the deduction of irrecoverable expenses
of drilling them as ordinary expenses . . .55
The option was again recast in 1932 by Treasury Decision
4333 " and has been continued in substantially the same
form ever since. This Treasury Decision provided an option
to deduct ". .. all expenditures for wages, fuel, repairs, haul-
ing, supplies, etc., incident to and necessary for the drilling
of wells and the preparation of wells for the production of
oil or gas . . ." No mention was made this time of expenses
"in connection with the exploration of the property," al-
54 W. R. Ramsey v. Commissioner, 66 F. 2d 316 (C.CA. 10th 1933), cert.
denied 290 U.S. 673, 54 S. Ct. 91, 78 L. Ed. 581 (1933).
55 Id. at 318.
56 XI-1 Cum. BULL. 31 (1932) (amending Treas. Regs. 45 and 62, Art. 223-
Treas. Reg. 65, Art. 225; Treas. Reg. 69, Art. 223; and Treas. Reg. 74, Art. 243)
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though examples of items to which the option applied in-
cluded expense of surveying and geological work necessary
in preparing for the drilling of wells. It was specifically
announced in Treasury Decision 4333 that the restatement
of the option resulted in no change in administrative policy
or practice under the regulations. This implied that expense
"in connection with the exploration of the property", as de-
scribed in the Regulations beginning with Regulations 45 in
1921, referred to expense of surveying and geological work
necessary in preparing for the drilling of wells, rather than
to costs of exploration necessary in determining what proper-
ties should be acquired or retained for the drilling of wells."
Possible disapproval of such a restrictive application of the
option was indicated by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in a dictum in Burnet v. Petroleum Exploration Com-
pany.58 In the course of holding that the capitalized cost59
of drilling wells should be recovered through allowances for
percentage depletion rather than depreciation, the court said:
The outlay for geological study and survey is directly con-
nected with the location or discovery of the oil deposit, and
would seem to be not subject in any way to depreciation but
should be allowed under depletion when capitalized. So with
the hole in the ground. It cannot be withdrawn or inven-
toried as having any independent value or resold as may be
done with casing, tools, or machinery. As the wages for labor
and other expenses in connection with the transportation and
work of a geologist in prospecting an oil field are a part of
the cost of discovery or development, so the wages for labor
57 Note judge Hill's positive position on this point in the case of The
Louisiana Land And Exploration Company, 7 TC 507, 516 (1946): "Petitioner
does not contend that the expenditure here involved is deductible under the
option accorded by the regulations, and if such contention were made we should
decline to adopt it The option is directed to the costs of preparations for the
drilling of particular wells after the drilling has been at least tentatively decided
upon, which preparations are far removed from over-all geophysical exploration
such as we are here considering."
58 61 F. 2d 273, 277 (C.C.A. 4th 1932), aff'd. 288 U.S. 467, 53 S. Ct. 439, 77
L. Ed. 898 (1933).
59 Cost included amounts paid to drilling contractors for drilling wells,
amounts paid for freight and haulage of equipment put into the wells, and
amounts paid for labor in installing the equipment in the wells.
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in drilling a well are such a part of the cost of discovery or
development as are not susceptible of depreciation." (Empha-
sis supplied.)
Article 223 of Treasury Regulations 69, which contained the
phrase "in connection with the exploration of the property,"
was before the court, whose use of the words "when capital-
ized" might imply that the outlay for geological study and
survey could have been deducted as an expense under the
option as then worded. Accordingly, it is reasonable to be-
lieve that regardless of the caution in Treasury Decision
4333 that no change in administrative policy or practice re-
sulted from the restatement of the option, the Fourth Circuit
might have thought that the option had actually been tight-
ened up.
Even if it be seriously contended that the option now
extends to costs of acquisition 1o legality of the option would
still be in doubt. In the F.H.E. Oil Company case,"' the tax-
payer sought to deduct (under the option) the intangible
drilling and development costs of wells which it had drilled
to prevent forfeiture of its properties. The Tax Court, in a
split decision, held that the wells were capital investments,
no part of the cost of which could be deducted as an expense.
The minority opinion merely pointed out that the option
expressly covered the costs in question. The Fifth Circuit
said (p. 1005):
The minority is right as to what the Regulation says. The
majority is right in holding that the Regulation in giving an
optional expense deduction cannot prevail against the fact
that a capital investment, an "improvement or betterment of
the estate or property" has been made, for by statute the cost
of such cannot be deducted as expense, but can be recouped
only by annual allowances for depletion or depreciation.
60 With respect to the scope of the option, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that it does not extend to intangible drilling costs incurred
as consideration for the assignment of oil properties. Hardesty v. Commissioner,
127 F. 2d 1002 (C.C.A. 5th 1945).
11 F. H. E. Oil Company v. Commissioner, 147 F. 2d 1002, motion for re-
hearing denied, 149 F. 2d 238, 2d motion for rehearing denied, 150 F. 2d 857
(C.C.A. 5th 1945).
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The court also remarked (p. 1003) that "if the option be in
truth contrary to the revenue statutes it is void, and it is
the duty of the judges to uphold the law, and disregard the
regulation." It specifically disagreed with the statement of
the Tenth Circuit in the Ramsey case "la to the effect that
there is a debatable question as to whether an oil well is a
permanent improvement, saying that a producing well is
clearly a permanent improvement.62
The point might be pressed that in 1945 Congress passed
a joint resolution stating its approval of the option covering
intangible drilling and development costs.63 However, it ap-
pears that Congress was well aware that exploration costs
were not covered by the option. Five years before, in con-
nection with what was to become Section 711(b) (1) (I) of
the Internal Revenue Code, a conference report 64 called at-
tention to a Senate amendment requiring corporations com-
puting their excess profits credit under the income plan to
exclude any "deductions in connection with exploration,
discovery, prospecting, research, or development of tangible
property, patents, formulae, or processes, or any combination
of the foregoing." It then stated that, upon conference, the
Senate amendment had been "limited to deductions allowed
in respect of expenditures for intangible drilling and develop-
ment costs paid or incurred in or for the drilling of wells
or the preparation of wells for the production of oil or gas,
or for development costs in the case of mines." (Emphasis
Gla W. R. Ramsey v. Commissioner, 66 F. 2d 316, 318 (1933).
G2 Compare the option formerly granted by Article 168 of Treas. Regs. 45,
62, and 65, whereby a taxpayer was permitted to deduct or capitalize expenditures
for designs, drawings, patterns, models, or work of an experimental nature cal-
culated to result in improvement of nis facilities or his product. With the pub-
lication of Treas. Reg. 69 in 1926, the option was withdrawn, apparently as a
result of emphatic decisions that such expenditures were capital. Gilliam Manu-
facturing Co., 1 B.T.A. 967 (1925); Goodell-Pratt Co., 3 B.T.A. 30 (1925). The
question that now appears to be wide open is: Will the option to capitalize or
deduct intangible drilling and development costs meet the same fate as the
former option covering designs, drawings, patterns, models, and the like?
13 H. CoN. Ras. 50, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
64 H. R. REP. No. 3002, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 46 (1940), which accompanied
the Second Revenue Bill of 1940.
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supplied.) Thus it was recognized that exploration costs
were not the same as intangible drilling and development
costs. Therefore, the joint resolution approving the option
covering intangible drilling and development costs appears to
be of no consequence insofar as exploration costs are con-
cerned.
ACCOUNTING PRACTICE AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF FACTOR
Much may be made by a taxpayer over its consistent
practice, down through the years, of charging exploration
costs to current expense. The answer probably is that the
virtue of consistency does not justify the vice of deducting
as ordinary and necessary business expenses what are in fact
capital expenditures. At least that is the answer that the
Tax Court has usually given. 8 However, in 1943 the Tax
Court issued a memorandum opinion which might be inter-
preted as some indication that the court could be prevailed
upon to give the virtue of consistency some reward-at least
where the consistency is in line with good business account-
ing practice. In Pittsburgh Screw and Bolt Corporation,66
the taxpayer had been issued a basic propeller patent in
1929, as a result of which it formed a propeller division in
its plant. From 1929 to 1938, it charged off to expense re-
65 Gilliam Manufacturing Co., 1 B.T.A. 967 (1925) ("The taxpayer has no
option to treat expense items as capital or capital expenditures as ordinary and
necessary expense of carrying on a trade or business . . . ") ; Goodell-Pratt Co.,
3 B.T.A. 30 (1925) (". . . from the standpoint of good accounting no right ever
vested in any business enterprise to treat certain expenditures according to either
of two diametrically opposed theories."); R. S. Newbold & Son Co., 7 B.T.A.
471 (1927) ("We have found that the costs should have been capitalized and
the fact that they were erroneously treated as expenses does not preclude the
petitioner from now correcting its error."); Frishkom Real Estate Co., 15 B.T.A.
463 (1929) (court upheld Commissioner's disallowance of a deduction of $900
expended for surveying and staking a parcel of land, saying that such an item
was a capital expenditure and that "petitioner's custom of treating such a charge
as an expense does not establish its character as such.") ; Magnetic Analysis Cor-
poration, P-H 1943 TC MEm. DEC. SEmv. 143,180 (1943) (costs incurred from
1930-1936 in development of machines, although currently charged off by tax-
payer during those years, allowed to be restored in computing invested capital
for excess profits tax purposes).
66 P-H 1943 TC MEm. DEc. SRV. ff 43,414 (1943).
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search and development costs amounting to $392,000. The
propeller division was sold in 1939, and, with a view to
increasing the basis thereof, the taxpayer sought to capital-
ize the costs originally charged off-even offering to make
any adjustments necessary during the earlier taxable years
that were barred by the statute of limitations. The Com-
missioner refused to permit the basis to be so increased, and
the Tax Court affirmed, because "it has not been demon-
strated that the proposed deferment or capitalization of all
the costs -in question is a better system or would more accu-
.rately reflect income." The court also made these significant
remarks (pp. 1325-1326):
There are many border-line cases in the matter of account-
ing. It maX well be questioned if the best accounting practice
in a business such as petitioner was conducting [viz. propeller
development, production, and sale] is not to charge research
and development costs to expense and if true income is not
better reflected thereby .... It was only in 1939 when it faced
a large tax on the sale of the Propeller Division assets that
it was suggested that the previous system was wrong. The
record does not satisfy us that the petitioner's practice, fol-
lowed with the approval of the respondent during the period
1929 to 1938, was erroneous and did not accurately reflect
income.
If such a comment could be made with respect to research
and development costs, might it not be made with respect to
the exploration costs of an oil company? The answer, dis-
cernable in the following paragraph, is "probably"--but not
by a majority of the court!
Any optimism engendered by the opinion in the Pittsburgh
Screw and Bolt case should be leavened with a realization
that the decision turned solely on burden of proof. In that
case the taxpayer had made a change in its accounting
method of treating research and development costs. Hence,
for purposes of Section 41 of the Internal Revenue Code,67
there was no "regularly employed" method of accounting for
187 See Note 33 supra.
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such costs." Accordingly, the Commissioner was authorized
to employ a method which, in his opinion, clearly reflected
the taxpayer's income. The method selected (which was the
one formerly used by the taxpayer) was to charge off as
expense the costs of research and development. The burden
of proof was then on the taxpayer to show that the Com-
missioner's method did not clearly reflect income."9 While
the new method which the taxpayer proposed to use was
clearly in line with previous holdings that research and de-
velopment costs must be capitalized, the taxpayer still lost
the case because it failed to prove that the Commissioner's
method did not clearly reflect income. Such a burden might
be almost impossible to sustain, because there are many
degrees of "clearness" in the reflection of income.7" On the
other hand, if the taxpayer had not changed from its method
of charging off research and development costs to expense,
and the Commissioner had, say in 1938, proposed a defi-
ciency on the ground that such Costs should have been
capitalized, the burden of proof on the taxpayer would have
been to show that its "regularly employed" method of ac-
counting did clearly reflect income. This burden would not
have been quite as difficult to uphold, because, as just pointed
out, there are many degrees of "clearness" in the reflection
of income. However, the doctrine of stare decisis makes it
68 Cf. Capital Warehouse Co., Inc., 9 TC 966 (1947), where during its first
two years of business the taxpayer, on .the accrual basis, sought to exclude from
income the amount of a reserve for removing goods- ("Reserve for Handling Out")
at the end of their storage period. The Commissioner's method of computing
the deficiency ignored the reserve. The court held for the Commissioner, dis-
tinguishing Towers Warehouses, Inc., P-H 1947 TC Mas. DEc. SERV. 1147,013
(1947), relied upon by the taxpayer, by saying that in the case before it there
was no question of deduction in conformity with a long-established practice.
(In the Towers case the taxpayer was upheld in its 25-year practice of deducting
such a reserve in computing its income.)
69 Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193, 54 S. Ct. 356, 78 L. Ed. 725 (1934).
70 Bradstreet Co. of Maine, 23 B.T.A. 1093 (1931), aff'd on this point,
65 F. 2d 943 (C.C.A. 1st 1933), where the Board admitted that conservative
accounting might justify the new method adopted by the taxpayer, but said that
such was not a perfect method and did not "more clearly" reflect income than
the Commissioner's method (which was the taxpayer's old method). The Board
also remarked that sometimes good accounting dictates more conservatism than
the necessities of income tax reporting permit.
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doubtful that such a burden would have been sustainable
in the Tax Court in the face of the numerous holdings by the
Board of Tax Appeals and the court itself that capital ex-
penditures are not deductible as ordinary and necessary
expenses. Similarly, it would seem that the burden would
be equally difficult to sustain before the Tax Court in the
case of an oil producer seeking to prove that its long-estab-
lished method of charging off exploration costs to expense
clearly reflects income.7' If such a case were to come before
one of the courts of appeals or the Court of Claims, it is
possible that evidence of accounting practices of the indus-
try, consistently followed by the taxpayer, might carry the
burden. At least, those courts do not have quite as fore.-
boding a line of direct or analogous precedents to discourage
a taxpayer.72 Finally, whether the Supreme Court would
71 Perhaps significant is the fact that the only exploration cases that the
Commissioner has contested before the Board of Tax Appeals or the Tax Court
appear to have involved treatment of exploration costs for the first time, rather
than treatment in accordance with a long-established, "regularly employed" method
of accounting. This means that the taxpayer had the burden of proving that
the method adopted by the Commissioner did not dearly reflect income-an
almost insuperable burden, as has just been pointed out.
72 Cf. J. I. Case Co. v. U. S., 65 F. Supp. 464 (Ct. CI. 1946) (court evi-
denced a liberal concept of acceptable accounting practice by allowing taxpayer
on the accrual basis to deduct taxes that had not accrued because they were
attributable to the taxable period under consideration); Huntington Securities
Corporation v. Busey, 112 F. 2d 368 (C.C.A. 6th 1940) (use of the word
"dearly" in the requirement that a taxpayer's accounting method "dearly reflect
the income" is in the sense of plainly, honestly, straightforwardly and frankly,
rather than in the sense of accurately or precisely) ; Osterloh v. Lucas, 37 F. 2d.
277 (C.C.A. 9th 1930) ("In our opinion all that is meant is that the books shall
be kept fairly and honestly; and when so kept they reflect the true income of
the taxpayer within the meaning of the law.") There are a number of unfavor-
able precedents in courts other than the Tax Court, however. Commissioner v.
Boylston Market Assn., 131 F. 2d 966 (C.C.A. Ist 1942) (requiring three-year
insurance policy to be prorated over three years); Clark Thread Co. v. Com-
missioner, 100 F. 2d 257 (C.C.A. 3d 1938) ("The benefits derived from this
right cannot be confined to the year in which it was acquired and, therefore,
the cost of acquiring it cannot be charged against income earned in that year.");
Moynier v. Welch, 97 F. 2d 471 (C.C.A. 9th 1938) (attorney fees and litigation
expenses held to constitute additional cost of oil properties); Home Trust Co. et
al. v. Commissioner, 65 F. 2d 532 (C.C.A. 8th 1933) ($75,000 paid by bank to
secure immediate possession of a 99-year lease held not deductible as an ordinary
and necessary business expense); Parkersburg Iron and Steel Co. v. Burnet, 48
F. 2d 163 (C.C.A. 4th 1931) (changes in lighting conditions held not deductible
as ordinary and necessary business expense, even though the purpose of the
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permit capital expenditures to be consistently charged off
as ordinary and necessary expense is, of course, conjectural,
although that body has manifested respect for business ac-
counting methods.7" However, the principle that expendi-
tures for items lasting substantially beyond the taxable year
should be capitalized is so long and firmly established in the
law of federal income taxation "' that a decision to overturn
it in favor of consistency is most unlikely.
How TO TREAT EXPLORATION COSTS FOR
FEDERAL INCOME TAx PURPOSES
Single Property Acquired
From the discussion early in this article relative to the
nature of exploration, it will be recalled that geological and
geophysical surveys are carried out in areas of interest which
have been selected after a careful study of all available
data. Exploration of each area of interest is ordinarily con-
ducted as a separate project 75 -usually under the name
that has been assigned to the area of interest. 76 Although
changes-increased productivity of plant-was not achieved); Dempster Mill Mfg.
Co. v. Burnet, 46 F. 2d 604 (App. D.C. 1931) (advances to subsidiary for
experimental purposes held to constitute capital expenditures).
78 In Lucas v. Kansas City Structural Steel Co., 281 U.S. 264, 50 S. Ct.
263, 74 L. Ed. 848 (1930), the court disapproved the taxpayer's practice of
valuing normal stock at a constant price regardless of cost or market, saying
that such method ". . . does not conform with the general or best accounting
methods and is apparently obsolete." But see Brown v. Helvering, note 69 supra,
where it was said that "It is not the province of -the court to weigh and deter-
mine the relative merits of systems of accounting."
74 This principle, now set forth in Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.41-3(2) (1943), was
laid down by the Treasury Department as long ago as 1921. Treas. Reg. 45, Art.
24(3) (1921). Congress has never seen fit to change the law with respect to
accounting methods (currently Section 41 of -the Code) as a result of the Regula-
tions, or to otherwise indicate its disapproval of the principle.
75 There may be exceptional instances where an area of interest is explored
piecemeal. If the exploration of each "piece" is conducted without reference to
the exploration of other "pieces", it would seem that there are several "projects".
76 For example: "Salt Creek"; "Indian Rock"; "X-50 Area". In the case
of a large producer, several projects may be conducted simultaneously, each under
the jurisdiction of a different geological or geophysical survey team. Often the
producer's own survey teams are augmented by teams from independent ex-
ploration companies.
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only a fraction of such area will probably be found desirable
for testing and exploitation, the purpose of a project is, none-
theless, to obtain data upon which acquisition of an interest
in that fractional part will be based. Therefore, if a property
is acquired on the basis of such data, the cost of the entire
project represents a cost connected with the acquisition of
an asset having a life extending substantially beyond the
taxable year. As such, all of the cost of the project should
be capitalized as a part of the cost of the property. Such
treatment is compelled by a realistic view of each explora-
tion project as a unified whole. In other words, all of the
shots made in surveying an area of interest by means of a
seismograph, for example, are used to prepare a contour
map on the basis of which a final decision will be made to
acquire or retain a property in or near the area."
Single Property Retained
Sometimes one or more properties are acquired prior to
exploration. In such a case, the purpose of the exploration
project is to obtain data needed to decide whether and to
what extent the properties should be retained for testing and
exploitation. If a property is retained on the basis of such
data, all of the cost of the project should be capitalized as a
part of the cost of that property, notwithstanding that other
properties are determined to be undesirable and are aban-
doned, Surrender of any properties would be merely inci-
dental to the purpose of isolating the area in which a pro-
perty should be retained and would not mean that a propor-
tionate part of the potential oil and gas in the area explored
was also surrendered.7 Indeed, it would hardly be expected
77 Compare ARTHuR ANDERSEN & Co., oP. cit. supra note 29, at 5, recom-
mending that a!! of the expenditures made for exploration of an area be capital-
ized as a part of the cost of a lease acquired on the basis of information obtained
from the exploration project.
78 Oil is of a "fugitive and wandering" nature and consequently possession
of the land is not necessarily possession of the oil. Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, No. 1,
177 U.S. 190, 204, 20 S. Ct. 576, 582, 44 L. Ed. 729, 737 (1900).
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that all of the properties in an area would be found suitable
for testing, although it might be sound practice to acquire
all of them prior to exploration for the purpose of insuring
against the possibility that a competitor might benefit from
knowing that an area of interest was being worked.7 If a
single property in a large acreage has been acquired prior
to exploration and, on the basis of data obtained from ex-
ploration, the property is retained in only a fraction of the
acreage, the same principles apply. Surrender of the pro-
perty in the rest of the acreage would be merely incidental
to the purpose of isolating the acreage in which a property
should be retained and would not mean that a proportionate
part of the potential oil and gas was also surrendered. More-
over, it would usually not be expected that all of the acreage
would be found suitable for testing.
Reconnaissance Survey Followed by Detail Survey
A relatively inexpensive reconnaissance survey is often
made over a very large area for the purpose of finding an
area of interest in which to conduct a detail survey. While
it is true that a reconnaissance survey is not confined to any
small, restricted area and may even cover several counties
in a short space of time, the decisive fact remains that data
obtained therefrom constitute the basis for the detail survey
that is conducted in any area of interest that is located in
the large area. Accordingly, the cost of obtaining such data
represents part of the cost of the detail survey; and, if a
property is acquired on the basis of data from the detail
survey, the combined cost of both surveys should be capital-
ized as part of the cost of the property.
7o Compare 4 SuMMMRs, OIL AND GAS 56 (1939), where it is stated that if a
particular area of land shows some surface indication of containing mineral
structure, "every move that an oil producer makes toward procuring leases or
testing the land by geophysical methods brings a flock of speculators, lessees and
royalty buyers who secure any sort of a mineral interest possible from the land-
owners."
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More Than One Property Acquired or Retained
Where, as a result of an exploration project covering a
particular area of interest, more than one property is ac-
quired or retained, a problem of allocating the cost of the
project arises. Allocation might be according to the respec-
tive values of the properties. Thus, if two properties are
acquired, one having an estimated value of $50,000 and the
other having an estimated value of $100,000, cost of the
project would be allocated on the basis of one-third and
two-thirds, respectively. However, since it would be almost
impossible to estimate the value of untested properties,8"
such a method appears to be impractical. The better method
would seem to be allocation according to the respective acre-
ages covered by the properties. Thus, if the two properties
acquired covered 1,000 acres and 3,000 acres, cost of the
project would be allocated on a basis of one-fourth and three-
fourths, respectively. This method bears some relation to
the use which was made of the data obtained from the
project, since the data were used as the basis for acquiring
properties covering acreage deemed suitable for testing and
exploitation.8
More Than One Area of Interest Located
Where, as a result of a reconnaissance survey, more than
one area of interest is located, in each of which a detail
survey is to be conducted, a problem of allocating the cost
of the reconnaissance survey arises. Here the number of
acres in an area of interest does not bear any reasonaLble
80 Cf F. A. Gillespie & Sons Co. v. Commissioner, 154 F. 2d 913 (C.C.A.
10th 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 781, 67 S. Ct. 204, 91 L. Ed. 670 (1946), where
the court indicated dissatisfaction with -the evidence of value contained in the
record, but affirmed the Tax Court's allocation of cost to properties sold and
properties retained on the basis of their respective values. No such dissatisfaction
was expressed in Columbia Oil & Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 118 F. 2d 459 (C.C.A.
5th 1941), but a reading of the opinion will convince one of the complexity of
problems of valuation of oil properties.
81 The "acreage basis" of allocating the cost of a lease covering three different
tracts was approved in Berkshire Oil Company, 9 TC 120 (1947).
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relation to the use which is made of the data obtained from
the reconnaissance survey, because such data are ordinarily
not precise enough to be used as a basis for a final decision
to acquire or retain properties covering acreage deemed suit-
able for testing and exploitation. They merely serve to iso-
late roughly the areas of interest to be surveyed by methods
designed to furnish more precise data. Thus, if two areas
of interest have been found, one of which is large and the
other small, a property may eventually be acquired or re-
tained only in the small area. However, since two distinct
detail survey projects have been established on the basis of
the reconnaissance data, the explorer has really developed
two "chances" of locating properties deemed suitable for
testing. Under such circumstances, it would appear proper
to allocate one-half the cost of the reconnaissance survey to
each detail survey and, in turn, to the property acquired or
retained on the basis of information furnished by the latter.
No Properties Acquired or Retained
Costs of an exploration project which fails to lead to the
acquisition or retention of a property would appear to con-
stitute a loss under Sections 23(e) or 23(f) of the Internal
Revenue Code 82 and would be deductible in full."8 How-
82 INT. REv. CODE § 23(e) provides that in computing net income of an
individual there shall be allowed as deductions "... . losses sustained during the
taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise- (1) if incurred
in trade or business; or (2) if incurred in any transaction entered into for profit,
though not connected with the trade or business . . ." INT. Ray. CODE § 23(f)
provides that in computing net income of a corporation there shall be allowed
as deductions 1..... losses sustained during the taxable year and not compensated
for by insurance or otherwise."
93 The Empire District Electric Co., 4 TC 925 (1945), where the issue was
the year of abandonment of a hydroelectric project. In 1923 the taxpayer was
granted a preliminary permit by the Federal Power Commission for a period
of three years for a project to consist of a dam across the White River at Table
Rock, Missouri, and the development of a hydroelectric plant at that site. From
1925 to 1930 the taxpayer engaged in core drilling for the dam foundations,
topographical surveying, preliminary engineering, and other preparations at Table
Rock. The expenses of this work, plus legal fees and costs of preparing applica-
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ever, the loss will not be allowed by the Commissioner unless
the taxpayer can show that the project, or the property to
which it relates, has actually been abandoned.84 Thus, at
the close of a taxable year, an oil company may find itself
in the middle of an exploration project, the results of which
may not be finally determined for some time. In such a case,
it cannot be said that a loss has been sustained, and con-
sequently no deduction in the amount of the costs of the
project is allowable. Deduction must await some identifiable
event, signifying abandonment."6
tions for the federal license, amounted to $330,000. Although most of this sum
was expended prior to 1933, the Board upheld the taxpayer's deduction of the
entire sum as a loss in 1936, when the project was abandoned. See also Charles T.
Parker, 1 TC 709 (1943) (cost of making test runs on a mining property follow-
ing favorable investigation report held to constitute a loss under INT. R1v. CODE
§ 23 (e) (2) upon bandonment of project). In Leslie N. Duryea and Ruth H.
Duryea, P-H 1947 TC MEm. DEC. SrEv. ff 47,230 (1946), the cost of investigating
several mining properties preliminary to investment in their acquisition, promo-
tion, and operation was held to be deductible (in the case of one not engaged
in the mining business) upon abandonment of the investigatory projects on
authorit[, of several cases holding such expenditures to be deductible either as
ordiia and necessary expenses or as losses from transactions entered into for
profi"-liting, among others, the Parker case and The Empire District Electric Co.
case. But cf. Robert Lyons Hague, 24 B.T.A. 288 (1931), where attorney's fees,
paid for investigations of propositions relating to the purchase of real estate,
were held nondeductible even though the propositions were never accepted. The
taxpayer argued that the costs of such investigations were deductible as losses
incurred in transactions entered into for profit, but the Board disagreed, saying
(p. 290): "The simple answer to this contention is that petitioner did not enter
into these transactions but, on the contrary, stayed out of them." However, it is
believed that the realistic answer is not quite that simple, and that the taxpayer
entered upon a transaction for profit from the moment that he ordered each
investigation. He did not know what the outcome would be, but he certainly
had some hope that the investigations would prove favorable enough to warrant
acceptance of the real estate propositions. Accordingly, he set the wheels in
motion whereby he hoped to realize a profit. The fact that the wheels stopped
soon thereafter is immaterial.
84 Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., P-H 1944 TC Mnar. DEc. Stay. f144,009
(1944) ($33,000 expended for legal and engineering fees in the investigation of a
contemplated natural gas pipe line project held not deductible as a loss because
the taxpayer failed to prove abandonment of the project during the taxable
year; no question was raised over the fact that the cost of investigation would
be deductible as a loss in the year the project was proved to have been abandoned.
85 Coalinga-Mohawk Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 64 F. 2d 262 (C.C.A. 9th
1933) (". . . . it is well settled that a loss is sustained within the meaning
of the statute in question only when the transaction in respect of which the loss
is claimed is closed and completed by some identifiable event . . ."); Portland
General Electric Co., P-H 1947 TC Mxs. DEc. SERV. 47,299 (1947) (mere
charge-off on taxpayer's books not sufficient to prove abandonment of hydro-
electric projects).
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CONCLUSION
Naturally, a realization that the Bureau of Internal Reve-
nue will be able to enforce its determinations that explora-
tion costs must be capitalized as part of the cost of proper-
ties acquired or retained as a result of exploration projects,
will not be a happy one for the taxpayers concerned. This
is because such taxpayers are already enjoying the advan-
tages of percentage depletion, so that any additional cost of
properties on which percentage depletion is being taken, will
never be recovered."0 However, the results to these tax-
payers could hardly be termed disastrous. In the first place,
only about one out of six properties that are acquired or
retained prove successful.8 7 The others are abandoned, and,
of course, the cost thereof (including exploration costs that
should have been capitalized) is deductible as a loss in the
year of abandonment. Accordingly, about five-sixths of the
capitalized costs of exploration will be recovered, sooner or
later. Indeed, recovery may be somewhat greater when one
takes into consideration the increase in cost depletion that
will result from capitalizing exploration costs-in the case of
those properties (few though they may be) on which cost
depletion is greater than percentage depletion. A one-sixth
86 Suppose that a taxpayer (whose practice has been to improperly charge
exploration costs to current expense) has purchased an oil property for $25,000,
after paying out $20,000 for an exploration project as a result of which the
property was acquired. It is estimated that 500,000 barrels of crude oil Will be
extracted over the life of the property. Suppose further that during the taxable
year 25,000 barrels of crude are extracted, resulting in gross receipts from the
property of $75,000 (allowing $3 per barrel) and net income of $50,000. On the
basis of percentage depletion of 27% per cent of gross receipts, the taxpayer
would be entitled to a depletion deduction of $20,625 (which is proper, inasmuch
as it does not exceed 50 per cent of net income and is greater than $1,250-the
amount of cost depletion computed on a basis of $25,000). INT. Rnv. CODE
§ 114(b) (3). If the exploration costs of $20,000 were properly capitalized as part
of the cost of the property, the basis for cost depletion would be $45,000, and cost
depletion would then be $2,250 instead of $1,250. However, allowable percentage
depletion of $20,625 is still far greater. Thus, by capitalizing exploration costs,
depletion would, in this case, not be increased at all.
87 See A e PamAorPm u  INSrrrur-, op. cit. supra note 9, at 288.
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increase in taxable income will assuredly increase the federal
income taxes of oil producers. However, it may be con-
fidently predicted that, as long as percentage depletion of
272 per cent remains on the statute books, the search for
oil will continue undiminished."8
Jack R. Miller*
88 "Since 1928 large oil and mining corporations have been entitled to
deduct from 5 to 27 per cent of their gross income as an allowance for the
depletion of their mines and wells, and the deduction may be taken even though
the cost of the property has been completely recovered. Thus, in 1936, one
mining company deducted nearly $3,000,000 under this provision, although it had
already completely recovered the cost of its property. The amount of the deduc-
tion was a sheer gift from the United States to this taxpayer and its stock-
holders, and the revenue that we lost thereby was $818,000. . . . The estimated
annual loss of revenue due to this source alone is about $75,000,000." RxVoRT OF
THE JOINT CoMEmmTTEE ON TAX EvAsIoN AND AVOmANCCE, H. R. Doc. No. 337, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1937).
* A.B., Creighton University; A.M., Catholic University; LL.B., Columbia Uni-
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Committee on Federal Income Taxes, Taxation Section, American Bar Association.
Formerly Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, Bureau of Internal Revenue. Assistant
Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
